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Judgments - Fraud as Basis for Collateral Attack - The plaintiff
Werner was a stockholder and former employee of a corporation. The
corporation had commenced an action against the plaintiff for money
due on an open account. The plaintiff began two actions against the
corporation and its officers to recover money due him for commissions,
to require an accounting, to recover for misappropriated funds, and to
remove the officers of the corporation for gross misconduct. The parties
agreed to an arbitration of several issues, one of which was the value of
sixty-four shares of the corporation's stock held by the plaintiff. The
arbitrator made an award finding the value of the stock to be $500.00
per share. Thereafter the plaintiff obtained an order to show cause
to vacate the award and stated in his affadavit that the award was
false and inaccurate by reason of the defendant's fraudulent suppression and concealment of the true facts pertaining to the value of the
stock. The lower court then entered an order permitting inspection of
all books and records of the corporation by the plaintiff. The defendants appealed from this order, and while the appeal was pending, the
parties settled the dispute, accepting the award and executing the releases. Thereupon summary judgment was entered dismissing the actions upon their merits. On the ground that he had new evidence of
fraud the plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for fraud in
inducing the plaintiff to sell his stock to the corporation at a price lower
than its value. Held: The dismissal of the prior actions upon their
merits was res judicata as to the question of defendant's fraud in this
action. The plaintiff cannot collaterally attack a prior judgment when
it appears he was not prevented from having a fair trial and when the
fraud alleged in this action is that which was adjudicated in the prior
actions. Werner v. Riemer 39 N.W. 2nd 457 (Wis., 1949).
Before the enactment of the Code in Wisconsin, b. judgment was
attacked by bill of review in equity.' The Code abolished this practice
and provided specific statutory grounds for attacking a judgment.2
However, fraud is not given as a ground for relief as it is in the statutes
of some states. In other states which like Wisconsin do not specifically
list fraud as one of the statutory grounds for relief, the courts sometimes by interpretation bring fraud within the purview of the specified
grounds.3 But the Wisconsin Court has stated that the Wisconsin statute
4
is applicable only where the enumerated grounds are present.
IUecher v. Thiedt, 133 Wis. 148, 113 N.W. 447 (1907).
2
Wis. Stat. 269.46 (1) The court may, upon notice and just terms, at any time
within one year after notice thereof, relieve a party from a judgment, order,
stipulation or other proceeding against him obtained, through his mistake,
inadvertance, surprise, or excusable neglect and may supply an omission in
any proceeding.
3 Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed. Vol. 1, Sec. 232, p. 459.
4 Royal Indemnity Co. v. Sangor, 166 Wis. 148, 164, N.W. 821 (1917).
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RECENT DECISIONS

The prevailing rule is that a judgment may be upset by collateral
attack only when the fraud is extrinsic, as distinguished from intrinsic.
Fraud is usually described as being intrinsic where the fraud alleged in
the collateral attack is based upon facts which were litigated or could
have been litigated in the prior action.5 Extrinsic fraud is said to exist
where a party has been prevented from having a fair trial or presenting
all his case to the court, or where the fraudulent conduct actually contributed in procuring the judgment.6 The Restatement of the Law of
Judgments is in accord with the latter statement. 7 New evidence not
previously available will not of itself warrant relief.8 Usually fraudulent concealment of facts which, if known at the trial, would have prevented the judgment is ground for relief.9 A good example of such
concealment occurred where a divorced wife was appointed administratrix of her deceased husband's estate and received a widow's distributive share. On sufficient evidence that she was divorced and remarried
at the time of the deceased's death, it was held that the administration
proceedings could be set aside on the ground that there was extrinsic
fraud in the concealment of facts in obtaining the judgment. 10 The leading case which draws the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
fraud is United States v. Throckmorton et all in which Justice Miller
stated as the reason for the rule:
"that the mischief of retrying every case in which the judgment
or decree rendered on false testimony, given by perjured witnesses, or on contracts or documents whose genuineness or
validity was in issue, and which are afterwards ascertained to be
forged or fraudulent, would be greater, by reason of endless
nature of the strife, than any compensation arising from doing
justice in individual cases."
The Throckmorton rule was followed in Uecher v. Thiedt,1 2 which
decision was relied upon in the instant case. In Uecher v. Thiedt a
husband and wife agreed to separate voluntarily. The husband represented that he was not worth more than $6,000, whereupon the wife
accepted $1,500 in lieu of all further claims that she might have against
him. The wife obtained a divorce. Upon the huband's death, the wife
asked that the divorce decree be set aside and that she be declared his
widow on the ground that he falsely represented his wealth, the truth
being that he was worth $16,000. However, the court held that this
5

Am. Juris. Vol. 31, Sec. 654, p. 230.
Ibid.
7 Restatement of the Law of Judgments, Sec. 118 (1942).
8 Ibid, Sec. 126.
9 Freeman on judgments, 5th Ed. Vol. 3, Sec. 1234, p. 2571.
10 Paul v. Paul, 41 S.D. 383, 170 N.W. 658 (1919).
6

31 United States v. Throckmorton et al., 98 U.S. 61, 25 L.ed. 93 (1878).
n Uecher v. Thiedt, 133 Wis. 148, 113 N.W. 447 (1907).
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was not such fraud as is necessary to set aside a judgment, since it did
not appear that the husband practiced any fraud which induced the
court to grant a divorce. Andther important Wisconsin case which is
frequently referred to by textwriters is that of Boring v. Ott.' 3 There
Ott and Pool had an employment contract which they mutually rescinded. After Pool's death, Ott concealed the rescission and successfully
brought a claim against Pool's estate on the contract. The judgment
was set aside as being obtained by fraud and perjury. Comparing
Uecher v. Thiedt and Boring v. Ott it is not difficult to see that the
fraud was extrinsic in the latter but not in the former.
The rule that a judgment can be collaterally attacked only in situations where the fraud is extrinsic or goes to procuring the judgment
has not been consistently followed by the Wisconsin Court. At an
early date perjury was held to be sufficient ground for relief from a
judgment.' 4 And it has been unequivocally stated that enforcement of
a judgment may be enjoined where it was obtained by intrinsic fraud
such as wilful perjury.' 5 Probably the best review and most vigorous
comment on the question appears in Laun v. Kipp wherein Justice Marshall said:
"the real principle of adjudications (Wisconsin) is that the
power of equity to relieve against unconscionable judgments will
not be strictly confined to such as are characterized by fraud
extrinsic."' 18
7
To distinguish intrinsic and extrinsic fraud is sometimes difficult.'
From this difficulty the question of the necessity of the distinction naturally flows. It is significant to note that the distinction has been expressly abolished in the Federal courts by an amendment to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.' 8 It has been often said that courts cannot
advantageously litigate issues which have been tried before. Justice
Marshall in Laun v. Kipp met this problem particularly well when he
said:
"The rule is not so closely fenced by technical lines but that wise
administration can enable the court to redress serious wrongs.
. . .Doubtless whether the facts require judicial interference
is largely matter of administration in a field where courts should
exert their power sparingly."
In the instant case it is difficult to see, under any rule, why the court
should have relieved the plaintiff from the judgment when he elected
to execute a release and where he did not even allege that there was
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any fraud inducing the release.
13 Boring v. Ott, 138 Wis. 260, 119 N.W. 865 (1909).

14 Stowell v. Elred, 26 Wis. 504 (1870).
15 Amberg v. Deaton, 223 Wis. 653, 271 N.W. 396 (1937).
'I Laun v. Kipp, 155 Wis. 347, 145 N.W. 183 (1914).
1Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed. Vol. 3. Sec. 1234, p. 2570.

28 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60B.

